ABSTRACT Risk analysis is a crucial component in any aviation application. The conventional risk analysis schemes for systems encompassing large amounts of data are based on the probability theory. However, in some practical systems, the components of complex systems may have few or even zero samples, in which case the risk cannot be evaluated simply via statistics. This paper proposes a novel aviation risk analysis scheme based on the chance theory, which is a generation of both probability theory and uncertainty theory. In this paper, a U-bowtie model is first established according to the graphic structure and step-wise analysis process. A risk belief metric is utilized, and the risk variable is modified by a logic algorithm based on the operational law of chance theory. Then, several risk belief formulas are built for different respective system configurations; the risk of output events in the U-bowtie model can be calculated via the corresponding formulas. Additionally, the most contributed basic event and the most effective measurement can be obtained through sensitivity analysis. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme is validated by a case study. The results presented here may represent an innovative approach to managing risk in larger classes of complex systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Risk, the root cause of dangerous incidents, is a combination of the probability of occurrence of harm as well as the severity of that harm [1] - [3] . Risk analysis is a process of identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing risk using a series of models and theories [4] , [5] . In the aviation safety field, there has been a great deal of research attention centered on risk and risk analysis because of the serious consequences of risk in terms of injury or death, property loss, and environmental effects [6] - [9] . For example, Insua et al. [10] , [11] provided a framework based on Bayesian statistics for risk management decisions to improve aviation safety at the state level; they built a model to forecast and assess the consequences of certain risky ''occurrences''. Barak and Dahooei [12] implemented fuzzy theory to evaluate airline safety from the perspective of efficiency. Cui et al. [13] proposed an aircraft safety index based on a bowtie model. Li et al. [14] proposed a Gaussian Mixture Model to monitor flight operations, identify risk, and improve safety.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Guoqi Xie. Modern aviation risk analysis centers mostly on quantitative methods and the key problem is how to cope with uncertainties in the process of risk quantification. In general, there are two types of uncertainties: aleatory uncertainty (caused by inherent randomness of the system) and epistemic uncertainty (originating from lack of knowledge about the system). Traditional risk quantification methods are based on historical statistics or simulation data; the risk probability distribution is fitted and risk is modeled by probability measurement [15] . In this case, there is no need to consider epistemic uncertainty because enough data can be obtained, and methods based on probability theory apply well to aleatory uncertainty, including Monte Carlo simulation [16] and the venture evaluation review technique (VERT) [17] . However, technological or economical difficulties in real engineering scenarios often result in a scarcity (or lack) of data, which can lead to epistemic uncertainty; it is difficult to obtain satisfactory results when dealing with risk quantification problem via probability theory. Non-probability methods have been developed [18] , in which domain experts provide statements of belief (also referred to here as ''belief degrees'') through which qualitative judgments are translated into numerical descriptions, including fuzzy set theory [19] , [ 20] and evidence theory [21] . Liu asserts that these methods may lead to counterintuitive results [22] - [23] . Consider the following example: in the Swiss cheese model, which is commonly used for risk analysis and management, it is assumed that an accident event can be traced to 10 failure domains and risk possibility measure of each failure domain is 0.9. The risk possibility measure of this accident event is about 0.35 based on fuzzy set theory. Obviously, this statement is counterintuitive. Besides, Liu also found that fuzzy set theory, interval analysis, rough set theory, and grey system theory are not self-consistent [24] .
For this reason, uncertainty theory has emerged as a new methodology for mathematical risk measurement in recent years. Uncertainty theory was founded by Liu in 2007 [25] and refined by Liu in 2010 [26] to circumvent the need for unreliable belief degrees. The duality axiom and product axiom of uncertain measures resolve the problem wherein the belief degree function has much larger variance than the real cumulative frequency. Uncertainty theory has been successfully employed across a wide array of scholarly domains including two-stage uncertain programming [27] , [28] , reliability analysis [29] , [30] , multi-objective optimization problem-solving [31] , and more [32] - [35] .
Quantitative bowtie analysis is the crux of aviation risk analysis approaches -the model accurately reflects links between the potential causes and consequences of risky events. It can be used to quantitatively assess aviation risk, determine the likelihood of consequences, and rank the importance of various risk incentives [36] - [38] . However, the bowtie model comes with a few unavoidable problems when applied to aviation risk analysis: 1) In the fault tree, there are some new or special types of subsystems and component with high reliability requirements, for which it is difficult to obtain accident samples. The lack of data for these subsystems and components should be compensated for by uncertainty theory rather than probability theory. In the same system, sufficient data can be secured for other subsystems and components to fit the probability density function, where the risk can be quantified under probability theory. For instance, samples of bolts, wrenches, and other accessories with universal applicability can be easily collected from other industries.
2) In the event tree, it is difficult to properly account for the frequency of effective safety barriers (i.e., control events), so the risk of a control event is mainly presented by expert experience rather than frequency.
These two problems constitute a complex hybrid system (also called an ''uncertain random system'') characterized by randomness and indeterminacy. In this case, risk quantification in bowtie analysis process cannot be conducted based only on probability theory or only on uncertainty theory. Chance theory, a mixture of probability theory and uncertainty theory, was first proposed by Liu [39] in 2013. It is viewed as an appropriate tool to model aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty simultaneously.
In view of the aforementioned discussion, this paper proposes a novel uncertain random bowtie (U-bowtie) risk analysis method tailored to uncertain random systems in the aviation industry based on chance theory. To the best of authors' knowledge, there has been no previous report on aviation risk analysis with a U-bowtie model via chance theory -it is yet an open problem with theoretical and applicable significance. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) A novel risk conduction and analysis model, the U-bowtie, is established according to relevant construction and operational processes. We express the components of the model (which are difficult to acquire relevant data for) as uncertain input variables including uncertain basic events in a fault tree and uncertain events in an event tree. We then dispose uncertain variables with uncertain algorithms for logic gates. The components supported by sufficient data are considered to be random variables in the U-bowtie model and solved by traditional logic algorithms. ''Risk belief'', a novel metric, is formulated to measure the riskiness of the uncertain random variable in the U-bowtie as a quantitative description suited to the hybrid system. The risk belief metric describes the risk level of the uncertain random system precisely and the U-bowtie model provides a highly rigorous analysis of aviation risk.
2) In consideration of the different connections between uncertain variables and random variables in the proposed U-fault tree analysis (U-FTA) model, we regard a small system in which basic events connecting the same logic gate belong to the same kind of variables as a simple system, while the rest are considered to be complex systems and are treated as Boolean systems mathematically. A simple system formula and a complex system formula are introduced to acquire the risk belief of the top event in U-FTA, respectively. Similarly, we can divide U-ETA into simple systems or complex systems according to the number of event chains that lead to a specific outcome event. The simple system formula is applied to an outcome event with only one event branch, while the complex formula is applied to an outcome event with several event branches. The ability to evaluate risk in both simple and complex systems allows U-bowtie analysis to provide practical and targeted results with a high degree of pertinence.
3) After choosing the appropriate formula, we conducted sensitivity analysis by observing the decreased extent of the outcome event when input events were given a certain degree of risk reduction. We identified the most significant risk resource to be controlled and the key control events to be implemented. Here, we use the tire system as an example to illustrate how to manage risk in a complex aviation system with both random variables and uncertain variables. Our case study suggests that U-bowtie analysis based on chance theory is well-suited to hybrid systems consisting of both uncertain variables (with limited data support) and random variables (with abundant data support).
The results presented below represent an innovative approach to aviation risk analysis via U-bowtie model and closely emulate actual engineering conditions. The proposed scheme can be applied not only in aviation risk analysis, but also as a theoretical basis for risk analysis in other high hazard complex systems (e.g., oil and gas, mining).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the mathematical basis of uncertainty and chance theories. In Section III, the U-bowtie model and novel risk metric are established. Section IV discusses the proposed U-bowtie analysis method in detail. Section V reports our case study, and Section VI contains a brief summary and conclusion.
II. UNCERTAINTY AND CHANCE THEORIES
Uncertainty theory, a new branch of axiomatic mathematics built on four axioms, has been widely applied as a tool for modeling subjective uncertainties. Under uncertainty theory, belief degrees related to certain events are quantified by defining uncertain measures:
Definition 1 [25] : Let be a nonempty set, and L be a σ -algebra over . A set function M is called an uncertain measure if it satisfies the following axioms, Axiom 1: M { } = 1 for the universal set . 
Uncertain measures of product events are calculated following the product axiom:
where L k are σ -algebra over k , and k are arbitrarily chosen events from L k for k = 1, 2, . . . , ∞, respectively.
Definition 2 [25] : An uncertain variable is a function ξ from an uncertainty space ( , L, M) to the set of real number such that {ξ ∈ B} is an event for any Borel set B of real numbers.
Definition 3 [25] : The uncertainty distribution of an uncertain variable ξ is defined by (x) = M {ξ ≤ x} for any real number x.
Theorem 1 [25] : Assume thatξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . , ξ n are independent Boolean uncertain variables, i.e., ξ i = 1 with uncertain measure a i 0 with uncertain measure 1-a i ,
where x i take values either 0 or 1, and v i are defined by
Theorem 2 [26] : Let ξ be an uncertain variable with an uncertainty distribution , and let k be a positive integer. Then the k-th moment is
Chance theory founded by Liu [36] is a mixture of uncertainty theory and probability theory to deal with problems affected by randomness and uncertainty Let ( , L, M) be an uncertainty space, and ( , A, Pr) be a probability space. Then ( , L, M) × ( , A, Pr) is called a chance space.
Definition 4 [24] : Let ( , L, M) × ( , A, Pr) be a chance space, and let ∈ L × A be an event. Then the chance measure of is defined as
Definition 5 [24] : An uncertain random variable is a function ξ from a chance space ( , L, M) × ( , A, Pr) to the set of real numbers such that {ξ ∈ B} is an event in L×A for any Borel set B of real numbers.
If an uncertain random variable ξ (γ , ω) does not vary with γ , it degenerates to a random variable. If an uncertain random variable ξ (γ , ω) does not vary with ω, it degenerates to an uncertain variable.
Definition 6 [24] : Let ξ be an uncertain random variable. Then its chance distribution is defined by
Theorem 3 [24] : Assume that η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η m are independent Boolean random variables, i.e., η i = 1 with probability measure a i 0 with probability measure 1-a i ,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , m, and τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ n are independent Boolean uncertain variables, i.e., 
where
where i = 1, 2, . . . , m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
III. U-BOETIE MODEL CONSTRUCTION A. MODEL CONSTRUCTION
The traditional bowtie model consisting of a fault tree and an event tree mainly contains two types of element: events and logic algorithms. In the fault tree, there are basic events (causes), logic gates (OR and AND), intermediate events, and a critical event (top event). In the event tree, there are a critical event (top event), events (control events), and outcome events (consequences). tree (U-FT) and an uncertain-event tree (U-ET). A simple example is given in Fig. 2 .
On the left side of the bowtie, a U-FT is constructed by events and logic gates. Basic events are the initiating events of the analysis process and logic gates allow the fault tree to be quantified. It is essential to define the degree to which it is believed that basic events will occur and to establish a new algorithm of logic gates in U-FTA based on chance theory.
The U-ET on the right side of the bowtie model complements the fault tree and reveals the critical event as the initiating event. The major elements of an event tree (events) are usually identified as accident escalation factors or safety barriers [37] . In this paper, safety barriers are taken as an example in which an uncertain random variable will be defined to describe the state of an event leading to failure or success and U-ETA based on chance theory is used to calculate the ''risk belief'' of the outcome events.
B. RISK BELIEF METRIC
We developed risk belief as a new risk metric for the U-bowtie model. Likelihood and probability are used to represent risk in the traditional, quantitative bowtie. Liu [24] referred to ''belief degree'' as a variable that reflects the strength with which one believes an event will occur. Peng [33] defined a risk index that is an uncertain measure of some specific loss. Zhang et al. [29] proposed the belief reliability metric to measure the reliability of an uncertain random system. Similar to the risk index and the belief reliability, the risk belief metric is used here to measure the risk of an uncertain random system.
Definition 7 (Risk Belief):
Let an event state variable ξ be an uncertain random variable and be the feasible domain which indicates the abnormal (or failure) state that may lead to risk and loss. The risk belief is defined as the chance measure that the event is in the abnormal state which may lead to an accident, i.e., ϑ RB = Ch {ξ ∈ } .
Remark 1:
The state variable ξ describes the behavior of the event while the feasible domain is a set of accident scenarios. When ξ reaches the failure state in , the event becomes the cause of the hazard.
Mathematically, let = {η 1 , η 2 }, where η 1 represents the safety sate of a system or an event while η 2 represents VOLUME 7, 2019 the risky state. The risk belief ϑ RB is defined as the chance measure of the event 2 = {η 2 }:
According to the duality axiom, the belief safety metric
Remark 2:
If the state variable ξ degenerates to a random variable, the risk belief metric will be a probability. Let ϑ (P) RB denote the likelihood of occurrence under probability theory. Then,
This means the system is mainly influenced by random uncertainty, and the risk belief is degenerated to the probability theory-based risk metric.
Remark 3: If the state variable ξ degenerates to an uncertain variable, the risk belief metric will be a belief degree. Let ϑ (U ) RB denotes the uncertainty degree of occurrence under uncertainty theory. So,
This means the system is mainly influenced by epistemic uncertainty, and the risk belief is degenerated to the uncertainty theory-based risk metric.
In Definition 7, the variable ξ describes the working state of a certain component of the subsystem which is often expressed as the event element, while the feasible domain reflects the risk of said component. When ξ falls in , the component (or subsystem) is ''at risk''. The risk belief metric reflects the level of risk based on chance theory. It is a new approach to measuring aviation risk which deviates substantially from probability, frequency, likelihood, or proportion. On the basis of the risk belief, the U-bowtie model is an entirely novel risk analysis technique.
IV. UNCERTAIN-BOWTIE ANALYSIS
We extended the U-bowtie model to a combination of uncertain random fault tree analysis (U-FTA) and uncertain random event tree analysis (U-ETA) to analyze the risk of a hybrid aviation system.
A. UNCERTAIN-FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
The U-FTA process is based on the U-FT process. The following two formulas are utilized to calculate the risk belief of the critical event through uncertain logic gates in the simple system and the complex system, respectively.
Theorem 4 (Simple System Formula): Assume an uncertain random system is simplified to a set of random subsystems (i.e., intermediate events) with risk belief ϑ 
RB,Bi , for AND gate
RB,Bj , for AND gate Equations in different environments are summarized in Table 1 and the logic gate algorithm under uncertainty theory is shown below. Based on the Table1, the risk belief of the intermediate events in the simple uncertain random system can be determined by ϑ RB,I , respectively. For independent random variables, the risk can be calculated by the product theorem based on probability theory. If risk moves through the ''AND'' gate, we have VOLUME 7, 2019 and if risk moves through the ''OR'' gate, we can have
For independent uncertain variables, the risk can be determined according to Axiom 4. If risk moves through the ''AND'' gate, we obtain
and if risk moves through the ''OR'' gate, we can obtain
According to the subsystem configurations and integration by different logic gates, the risk belief of the critical event can be calculated as follows:
forANDgate.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4. A structure function must be defined to dispose of complex systems.
Definition 8(System Structure Function):
Assume that a complex system is Boolean and comprised of n basic events BE 1 , BE 2 , . . . , BE n . Then a Boolean function f is its structure function, and f (BE 1 , BE 2 , . . . BE n ) = 1 indicates that the top event occurs while BE 1 , BE 2 , . . . BE n = {0, 1} n .
Theorem 5(Complex System Formula):
Assume that an uncertain random system is Boolean. It has a structure function f and contains independent random events η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η n with risk possibilities ϑ RB,Bm , respectively. Then the belief of the uncertain random system CE can be given by:
with 
where x i = 1 and y i = 1 indicate that the basic event fails. Proof: It follows from Definition 7 of risk belief and Definition 8 of structure function that CE = f (η 1 , . . . , η n , τ 1 , . . . , τ m ) ,
in which the structure function f and the values of η i , τ j which satisfy f (η 1 , . . . , η n , τ 1 , . . . , τ m ) = 1 change in different branches, and that
It follows from Theorem 1 that f (x 1 , . . . , x n ,τ 1 , . . . , τ m ) is essentially a Boolean function of uncertain variables when (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is given and M{f (x 1 , . . . , x n , τ 1 , . . . , τ m ) = 1} = f * (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is determined.
According to Theorem 3, we can obtain
This completes the proof of Theorem 5. 
Example 1:
A simple system is shown in Fig. 3 . The risk belief of intermediate events is calculated as follows:
According to Theorem 4, the risk belief of the critical event can be calculated as follows:
B. UNCERTAIN-EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
The U-ETA process is based on the U-ET, followed by two formulas in U-ETA which serve to evaluate the risk belief of outcome events.
Theorem 6 (Simple System Formula): Assume that an event tree has l outcome events and that each outcome event contains independent random events η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η n with risk probabilities ϑ RB,Em , respectively. The risk belief of the uncertain random system OE k is:
RB,Ej , (8) where k = 1, . . . , l.
Proof: The process is similar to the proof of Theorem 4. Let ϑ RB,Ei represent the risk belief of control events. It degenerates to ϑ (P) RB,Ei which describes the probability of control events in a random system, while ϑ Equations in different environments are summarized in Table 2 . The risk belief of OE k can be written as:
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem 7 (Complex Formula):
Assume that an event tree has l outcome events and that the kth outcome event OE k has s branches. Each branch contains independent random events η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η n with risk possibilities ϑ RB,Em , respectively. The belief of OE k is:
, (9) where k = 1, . . . , l and t = 1, . . . , s.
Proof: Based on Theorem 6, if there are several event chains that can lead to OE k , the risk belief of OE k can be obtained by addition.
The risk of independent random variables can be calculated based on the addition theorem:
The risk of independent uncertain variables can be obtained by addition while obeying Axiom 3:
To sum up, the risk belief of OE k can be calculated as follows:
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Example 2: An event with three control events is shown in Fig. 4 . According to Theorem 6, the risk belief of outcome events is calculated as follows: a 1 ) ∧ (1 − a 3 )) ; where ϑ RB,CE is calculated as in Example 1.
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C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS Sensitivity analysis is a systematic approach that can provide a quantitative evaluation to identify the weakest links between input and output variables in a system or model. In a U-bowtie model, sensitivity analysis is utilized to evaluate contributions of basic events (BE) and events (E) and identify the most crucial events (BE and E). In this section, an analytical method is described which reveals the most ''sensitive'' input events in an uncertain random bowtie model. It is a two-step process.
First, according to the algorithm based on chance theory, an ''important basic event set'' can be identified. The importance of each event in the set can then be evaluated. Birnbaum importance is mainly used to rank the input events by calculating the difference between the risk of a system including and excluding the contributed input event x i . It is defined as follows:
where P ( OE i = 1| x i = 1) represents the probability that ith outcome event occurs when x i (i.e., a basic event or a control event, BE or E) occurs, and P ( OE i = 1| x i = 0) represents the probability that ith outcome event occurs when x i does not occur.
An uncertain event can be defined as:
represents the belief degree that ith outcome event occurs when x i (i.e., a basic event or a control event, BE or E) occurs, and M { OE i = 1| x i = 0} represents the belief degree that ith outcome event occurs when x i does not occur.
The parameter I B xi is used to rank the basic events in the fault tree and events in the event tree.
Risk reduction provides a numerical estimation of risk in outcome events while the likelihood or belief degree of the input events are reduced, mitigated, or eliminated. In this paper, risk reduction is described in two ways: 1) Reducing 20% the risk belief of input event x i , where it is assumed that the risk belief of x i (i.e., ϑ RB,Bi and ϑ RB,Ei ) is reduced by about 20% and thus the risk reduction of the output event (i.e., the critical event and outcome events) and the risk reduction of per percentage x i devalued can be observed.
2) Eliminating the risk of input event x i , where it is assumed that the input event x i has been eliminated and its risk belief is 0. Thus, the risk reduction of the output event can also be observed.
V. CASE STUDY
The military aircraft is a system full of uncertainty both aleatory and epistemic. The tear system is crucially important to guarantee the safety of the aircraft; it can lead to a fatal crash accident if managed improperly.
We used a previously published tear system description [13] to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed U-bowtie analysis, as it is affected by both random and uncertain variations. The U-bowtie model based on historical data and expert knowledge is shown in Fig. 5 . In the fault tree, there are 16 basic events and a critical event led by the basic events through 8 intermediate events and logic gates. In the event tree, there are 4 control events used to mitigate risk of the critical event; there are 4 resulting outcome events. Above all input events, 10 basic events (BE 1 , BE 2 , BE 3 , BE 5 , BE 6 , BE 7 , BE 8 , BE 13 , BE 14 , BE 15 ) can be defined as random variables with the risk belief ϑ 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15) , and others (BE 4 , BE 9 , BE 10 , BE 11 , BE 12 , BE 16 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 ) can be defined as uncertain variables with the risk belief ϑ Step 1: First of all, we summarized the likelihood and distributions of random variables from statistical data and the belief degrees from experts and experienced engineers as the distributions of uncertain variables. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 .
The distribution of random variables is judged first by the fault mechanism. Parameters in the specific distribution can be calculated by statistical data. For example, for most electromechanical products which submit to lognormal distribution, there are two parameters: µ = log MTBF 2 √ Var + MTBF 2 ,σ = log Var MTBF 2 + 1 , where Var and MTBF are given by historical data. For most electric products submitted to exponential distribution, the parameter is λ = 1 MTBF. The failure rate function λ(t) can be determined accordingly.
The distribution of uncertain variables is evaluated based on expert knowledge. The parameters in the specific distribution can be calculated by Theorem 2 with the empirical data. For example, let k = 2, then, for the normal uncertainty distribution (x ∈ R * ):
For the zigzag uncertainty distribution:
.
For the linear uncertainty distribution:
We used a questionnaire to acquire expert knowledge about the parameters in the distribution. The results are shown in Tables 5-7. As described above, the uncertain distribution was determined accordingly.
Step 2: Cui [13] stated that the safety index of gear system has a sudden drop at the time point 500-600FH. In this paper, we choose the risk belief of basic events and events in 550FH to calculate ϑ RB,CE and ϑ RB,OEi .
Let t = 550, we obtain Step 3: According to Theorem 4, Theorem 5 under chance-theory-based fault tree analysis, and Theorem 6 under chance-theory-based event tree analysis, the risk belief of the critical event and outcome events are given as follows.
Firstly, from Fig.5 , the structure function is given by
) where x i are the random variables and y i are the uncertain variables.
It follows from Theorem 5 that the risk belief of the critical event CE can be expressed as
From Table 3 , we can see that there exists 10 random variables in the system, and we can combine them into 2 10 VOLUME 7, 2019 cases when calculate ϑ RB,CE . For the sake of brevity, we know that we only need to pay attention to 10 valid cases of f = 0. Hence we have the following qualifications:
Then the risk belief of the critical event can be calculated as follows
Next, we take one of the ten cases as an example (x i = 0), and it can be obtained that 
Similar to the case 1 and we calculate other 9 cases separately. Finally, we can have ϑ RB,CE = 1.48 × 10 −4 .
According to (8) and (9), one has
Step 4: Next, we identified the most important basic event and most effective control event to continue the risk reduction analysis. As indicated in Step 3, BE 10 , BE 11 , BE 12 , BE 13 are more important than other basic events and E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 will impact the four outcome events, respectively. BE 11 and BE 13 are considered the most contributed basic events as per the Birnbaum importance. Each outcome event has its own effective event.
Finally, we performed sensitivity analysis to analyze the specific influence of said events; the results are shown in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 shows the significant variation of the risk belief of the critical event while the most contributed basic events BE 11 , BE 13 varied. Table 9 highlights E 2 , E 3 as the most effective control events preventing the occurrence of OE 3 (i.e., severe damage to the aircraft). The risk reduction of OE 3 caused by different measurements is provided in Fig. 6 . The initial level is the risk belief of OE 3 without any measures. The sector graph illustrates that the optimal combination for OE 3 reduces the risk belief of both BE 13 and E 2 E 2 . The result is a realistic measure for reducing the risk of OE 3 . different measures can be found for other outcome events through further attempts. Remark 4: By comparison against a similar method proposed by Cui [13] , our proposed approach applies to risk analysis of any system containing uncertainty and probability in realistic engineering conditions. It disposes the lack of data in military aircraft using uncertainty distributions, while Cui utilizes probability density function. For example, BE 4 is described by Lognormal distribution and the components' failure probabilities is computed by equation (12) . However, sufficient data cannot be collected for statistical analysis in practical projects. Thus, BE 4 is described by uncertain Normal distribution with parameter e, σ based-on the Uncertainty theory in our paper. For a specific outcome event, the results calculated in this paper are more precise and interpretable than the results listed in Cui's risk matrix [13] . What's more, the most effective measurements and combinations to control the consequence can be identified through sensitivity analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Aviation risk has various sources including natural causes and disasters, accidents, and threats from project failures. To prevent dangerous or undesired consequences, it is necessary to identify hazards, assess risks, and set safety barriers. This paper proposed an innovative aviation risk analysis approach: a U-bowtie model with a risk belief metric under which uncertainties may be disposed of effectively within realistic engineering scenarios. The most notable results of this study can be summarized as follows. 1) We presented an alternative method based on chance theory to overcome scarce or lacking data while managing uncertainty.
2) The ''risk belief'' metric was defined to measure event riskiness, i.e., the degree to which it is believed that a risky event will occur (or how serious it will be).
3) A U-bowtie model is built including different formulas to estimate risk. The chance theory-based U-bowtie approach and corresponding theoretical formulas eliminate the effects of epistemic uncertainty and provide the risk belief of output events in any particular system configuration.
4) Sensitivity analysis yields practical results. Recognizing the most important hazard and control event has crucial significance in terms of practical operation; it provides a strong basis for risk decision-making and targeted reinforcement or training.
In the future, the work presented here may be extended to risk function, sensitivity analysis, and other applications. Risk prognostics and risk decisions can also be considered worthwhile future extensions of bowtie analysis. 
